Nonefficient allocation of limited water resources is one of the main reasons for conflict among different stakeholders in a basin. With this regard, the application of conflict resolution models as a sustainable solution is suggested for water allocation, especially for the major consumer such as agricultural sector. In this study, game theory is used for conflict resolution problem and non-symmetric Nash product is considered as the objective function. Utility functions of stakeholders are assumed as nonlinear functions. The model is applied to the Zarrinehrud River system in Northwestern Iran. This model has been then solved by using the Genetic Algorithm. The optimum share of the river's stakeholders has been derived in three different scenarios (based on the importance of the users) in the twelve-month period. Results confirm that the optimum decision on water cosnumption depends on the weight of the consumers. In the case of equal weights, 780, 323, 78 and 501 million cubic meters should be assigned to agricultural, industrial, domestic and environmental users, respectively in 2020 and in the condition that the relative importance are equal, the share of the West Azerbaijan, East Azerbaijan and Kurdistan and also Urmia Lake from the available water resources are 38, 17, 16 and 39 percent, respectivly.
Zarghami, M., & Safari, N. (2013). Optimum Water Allocation for Agricultural Section of Zarrinehrud River by Non-Symmetric Nash Modeling. Agricultural Economics, 7(2), 107-125.
MLA
Mahdi Zarghami; Nasim Safari. "Optimum Water Allocation for Agricultural Section of Zarrinehrud River by Non-Symmetric Nash Modeling". Agricultural Economics, 7, 2, 2013, 107-125.
HARVARD
Zarghami, M., Safari, N. (2013). 'Optimum Water Allocation for Agricultural Section of Zarrinehrud River by Non-Symmetric Nash Modeling', Agricultural Economics, 7(2), pp. 107-125.
VANCOUVER
Zarghami, M., Safari, N. Optimum Water Allocation for Agricultural Section of Zarrinehrud River by Non-Symmetric Nash Modeling. Agricultural Economics, 2013; 7(2): 107-125.
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